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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT-RuilmANGEMENT NOT 
A N:ew CoNSTITUTION.-A convention was authorized to propose revision, 
alterations, or amendments to the existing state Constitution. After pro-
posing several amendments which were adopted at popular elections, the 
convention appointed a special committee to draft a rearrangement of the 
Constitution and amendments. The reported rearrangement contained slight 
changes of substance, while declaring that "Such Rearrangement shall not 
be deemed * * * to change the meaning or effect of any part of the Consti-
tution * * * as theretofore existing or operative." This Rearrangement was 
adopted by the convention and ratified by the voters by a large majority. 
Following an advisory opinion by the supreme court, the administrative 
officials refused to publish the Rearrangement as the Constitution. On man-
damus, held, the Rearrangement is not the state Constitution. Loring v. 
Yeung, (Mass., I92I), 132 N. E. 65. 
The law is well acquainted with judicial review of the method of adopt-
ing constitutional amendments. McCommghy v. Secy. of State, Io6 Minh. 
392, and cases cited. Courts have taken cognizance of the possibility of 
amendments contradictory in terms being adopted at the same election. In 
re Senate File 3r, 25 Neb. 864; McBee v. Brady, 15 Ida. 761. But the solu-
tion of the conundrum, "When is a Constitution not a Constitution?" appears 
to be unique. The reasoning in the instant case is somewhat elusive, but the 
theory seems to be that the committee which drafted the Rearrangement, 
the convention which adopted and submitted it to the people, and the sov-
ereign people who voted for it did not intend to adopt a new Constitution 
but merely a more or less convenient digest or index of the Q:mstitution of 
178o and its sixty-six amendments. The absurdity of the result.would almost 
answer the argument upon which it is based. Article 157, quoted above, is 
somewhat ambiguous. The sensible and widely quoted rule of construction 
was laid down by Lord Coke that each part of a statute should be construed 
with reference to the other parts and with a view to the mischief it was 
intended to remedy. Co. LIT., 38Ia. In applying this rule to Article 157 
much help is found in the other sections. The document is entitled, "A 
Constitution, or Form of Government." Article 158 declares that "1'his 
form of government shall be * * * a part of the laws of the land." The first 
sentence of Article 157 provides that the Constitution should thereafter be 
published in such rearranged form. These provisions _seem consistent only 
with the idea that a Constitution rather than a digest was intended. The 
evil to be remedied was the clumsy a.'n'.d unintelligible form of the Constitu-
tion of 1780 with its sixty-six amendments which made many parts obsolete. 
How this evil is to be remedied by a digest, which, in view of the changes 
in substance, is not even accurate, is far front clear. The most plausible con-
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struction of the ambiguous part of Article 157 would be that provisions in 
the Rearrangement should receive the same interpretation as similar pro-
visio:ns in the Constitution of 178o had received. This obviously would not 
apply to the instances of change in substance. In the last analysis, it must 
be remembered that the source of all constitutional authority is the will of 
the people, and it is submitted that the majority of the court displayed an 
over-technical attitude toward the people's solemn pronouncement. See 
Coor.EY ON CoNSTITUTIONAI. LIMITATIONS [7th Ed.], 9I and IOI, and DoDD ON 
THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS, !02. 
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw-Du:e PROCESS-0P.ERATION oN PrusoNER WITHOUT 
A HEARING.-Acts 1907, c. 2I5, authorized the board of managers of institu-
tions intrusted with the care of defectives and confirmed criminals to per-
form an operation of vasectomy on an inmate, if deemed advisable to pre-
vent procreation, but gave the inmate no opportunity to cross-examine the 
experts who decided upon the operation, or to co:n:trovert their opinion. 
Held, unconstitutional as denying due process of law. Williams et al. v. 
Smith, (Ind., I921), 131 N. -E. 2. 
It might be of interest to note that the operation of vasectomy (which 
consists of ligating and resecting a small portion of the vas def ere11s) was 
performed for the first time in this country by Dr. H. C. Sharp on certain 
convicts in the Indiana State Reformatory in 1899, and that the subsequent 
statute in that state, here declared unconstitutional, was the first one of its 
kind in the United States. The decision in the I;r{diana case is placed upon 
the ground that the statute deprives the prisoner of his day in court, in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, the 
court citing Davis v. Berry, 2I6 Fed. 413, which held an Iowa statute uncon~ 
stitutional for the same reason. In the latter case, however, the statute was 
a penal one, the operation being authorized on all criminals who had been 
twice convicted of a felony, and the court declared it unconstitutional for 
the further reason that it was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. In this the case squarely 
refused to follow State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65. In Michigan a statute (I 
CoMP. L., 1915, Sec. 5176 et seq.) providing for sterilization of mentally 
defective persons maintained wholly or in part by public expense was held 
unconstitutional in Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, the court 
saying: 
"In this enactment the legislature selected out of what might be 
termed a natural class of defective and incompetent persons only those 
already under public restraint, leaving immune from its operation all 
others of like kind to whom the reason for the legislative remedy is 
normally and equally, at least, applicable, extending immunities and 
privileg~s to the latter which are denied the former." 
A similar statute was held unconstitutional in New Jersey for the same 
reason. Smith v. Board of E~aminers, 85 N. J. Law, 46. The holding of 
the principal case is right from the standpoint of law and fairness. The 
:field of negative eugenics is a new one, and authorities are not agreed as to 
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its doctrines. 5 JoUR. oF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 5I4; 4 ibid. 326, 8o4-
If at the present time society believes it can better protect and preserve 
itself by preventing the propagation of thPse whom it deems unlit, it should 
at least be zealous to throw every possible constitutional safeguard around 
the objects of its legislation. But as yet no case has gone to the root of the 
matter. The few cases involving these statutes have been decided on purely 
procedural grounds; fundamentals were not in issue. One is awaited with 
interest which will weigh the various factors of public welfare and the 
rights of the individual, together with the doctrines of science, and decide 
fundamentally whether a state has a right to enforce such a statute. See 
also 6 MICH. L. J ouR. 289, II MICH. L. Rmr. ISO, 12 ibid. 400, I3 ibid. I6o. 
CoNS'tI'.l'U'l'IONAL LAw-V ALIDI'.l'Y oF ra:e Nmm'ESN'.l'H AMENDMEN'l'.-On 
a petition to strike the names of two female citizens from the registry of 
voters, it was alleged that neither of them was entitled to register, as the 
Constitution of Maryland confined suffrage to males, and that the Nine-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution providing for woman suf-
frage was invalid since it had never been "legally proposed, ratified or 
adopted as a part of the Constitution"; and that it was "in excess of any 
power to amend the Constitution."· Held, petition should be dismissed, as 
the amendment is valid. Leser et al. v. Garnett et al., Board of Registry, 
(Md., 192I), II4 Atl. 840. 
In the instant case the Maryland Supreme Court, following the decision 
of the federal Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 22I; Hawke v. 
Smith, 253 U. S. 23I; Rhode Island v. Palmer (National Prohibition Cases), 
253 U. S. 350, 386, holds that the states cannot impose limitations on the 
amending power of the United States Constitution nor limit the rights of 
legislatures or conventions to ratify a proposed amendment. The court 
disposes of the argument that the amendment is not within the amending 
power of the Constitution by referring to the Fifteenth Amendment, and 
citing United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 2I4, and Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, to show the privilege of Congress to propose amendments forbidding 
the United States or the several states from discriminating against any 
class of its citizens in regard to their right to vote. The constitutionality 
of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments has been questioned before, 
but their validity has been uniformly sustained in the federal com:ts. For 
the men sitting on the Supreme Court of a state, or even of the United 
States, to declare invalid an amendment submitted by a two-thirds vote of 
both houses of Congress, and ratified by three-fourths of the state legisla-
tures, would certainly involve political consequences of a serious nature, for 
a constitution based on the sovereignty of the people must enlist their sup-
aiort to be effective. Unless they are willing to act through it, rather than 
through some other mode of expression, it loses all force. The Constitution 
must grow and expand with the nation or be cast aside. From a practical 
standpoint, arid despite all fine-spun legal theory, it would seem that the 
vast silent majority of the American people have the constitutional right to 
change their own Constitution. Many authors have discussed the general 
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subject, among them being the present Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, writing in 29 YALE L. ]OUR. 821. For an opposing view, see 
an article by J. D. White, 5 CoRNI'!f,L L. Q. u3. Although now chiefly of 
academic interest, the bibliography of the subject may be found in a foot-
note in 19 MICH. L. R£v. 3 and 4. 
CoNTRAC'tS-ASSIGNMENT oF RIGHTS.-The owners of certain patents 
licensed the defendants to use the patented machine and agreed to give 
them such advice as they needed respecting the mode of use of the machine. 
The defendants agreed to use their best efforts to increase the sale of the 
product and to pay certain royalties for the license. Later, the owners of 
the patents assigned their rights under the patents to the plaintiff, subject 
to the license of the defendants. The defendants refused to pay over the 
royalties to the plaintiff, who brings action for the royalties due. Held, a 
contract which involves personal services cannot be assigned in part and 
abide in the original parties to it in part. Paper Products Machine Co. v. 
Safepack Mills et al., (Mass., 1921), 131 N. E. 288. 
The court in the principal case relies for. its decision mainly on the cases 
of Delaware County Commissioners v. Diebold Safe and Lock Co., 133 U. 
S. 473, and New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246. But 
these cases cannot be used as authorities to support this case. In Delaware 
Cou11ty Commissioners v. Diebold Safe and Lock Co., there was attempted 
an assignment both of rights and duties, and in addition the assignee tried 
to recover more compensation than was due under the original contract. 
Moreover, the part of the opinion in this case relied on by the court in the 
principal case was merely dictum. In New England Cabinet Works v. Morris 
there was also attempted an assignment both of rights and duties, while in 
the principal case there was only an assignment of rights. The court here 
fails to see that contracts are made up of rights and duties. That, although 
it is true that duties cannot be assigned and that the assignee cannot be 
compelled to perform them, yet if the assignor carries out the obligations, 
even though they are of a non-delegable kind, the rights under the contract 
can be assigned. This proposition is upheld by the great number of employ-
ment contract cases in which it has been decided that an assignment may 
be made of wages to be earned in the future under an existing contract of 
employment. Ka11e v. Clough, 36 Mich. 436; O'Keefe v. Alle1~, 20 R. I. 414; 
Rodijkeit v. Andrews, 74 Oh. St. 104; Norton, Res., v. Whitehead, Adm., 
App., 84 Cal. 263. In fo r.e Wright, 157 Fed. 544, the court says: 
"The fact that a contract for services involves personal trust and 
confidence, and is therefore not assignable as an entirety, does not 
prevent the assignability of rights arising out of such contract, as for 
compensation earned thereunder, where the matter of personal con-
fidence is not involved in such right." 
See also 18 MICH. L. R£v. 285. 
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CoNTRAC'l's-CoNSIDERA'.l'IoN-ADtQUACY.-The purchaser in a land con-
tract which provided for forfeiture, being in arrears in his payments, pur-
ported to assign his equity, which amounted to approximately $300, to the 
vendor in consideration of a cash payment of $5. In a suit in equity brought 
to recover the amount paid on the contract in excess of the rental value of 
the premises, held, that the assignment was ineffectual because the consid-
eration for it was grossly inadequate. Beaden v. Bra1isford Realty Co., 
(Tenn., l9:n), 232 S. W. 958. 
It is noteworthy that the court in the principal case seems to place its 
decision squarely upon the ground of inadequacy of consideration pure and 
simple. It is generally said that mere inadequacy is not a ground for inter-
ference in equity any more than it is at law. See POMEROY, EQtJITY Jt;RIS-
PRUDtNc:E, [4th Ed.], §g26, citing many cases. Also, litdge v. Wilkins, 19 
Ala. 765; Knabb v. Lindsay, 5 Ohio 469; Davidson v. Little, '22 Pa. St. 245. 
It is sometimes said that the inadequacy may be so great as to raise a con-
clusive presumption of fraud. However, most of the cases in which this 
statement is made will, on examination, be found to contain evidences of 
other circumstances tending to justify equitable interference. See Prieden-
tial fosurance Co. v. LaChance, n3 Me. 550; Madison Co. v. The People. ex 
rel., 58 Ill. 456; Byers v. Siirget, I9 How. (U. S.) 303; M orriso v. Philliber, 
30 Mo . .I45. There is no doubt that gross inadequacy is evidence of fraud 
in fact. Davidson v. Little, 22 Pa. St. 245; Morriso v. Philliber, 30 Mo. I45· 
CoNTRAC'l'S-CONSIDERATION-DOING. WHAT 0Nt IS ALREADY UNDER CoN-
TRAC'l' To Do.-Where the parties to an employment contract entered into a 
second agreement, differing from the first only in the amount of the compen-
sation, held, second agreement enforcible upon a finding that there had been 
an express, simultaneous rescission of the first contract. Schartzreich v. 
Bauman-Basch, Inc., (N. Y., l92I), I3I N. E. 887. 
The general rule is that a promise to perform, or performance of, what 
one is already under contract to do, is not a sufficient consideration for a 
promise of increased compensation or other additional benefit, since there 
is neither detriment to the promisee nor benefit to the promissor. Harris v, 
Watso1i, Peake 72; Frazer v. Hatton, 2 C. B. N. S. 5I2; Alaska Packers 
Ass'n v. Domenico, II7 Fed. 99.; Phoenix fos. Co. v. Rink, no Ill. 538; 
McQuaid v. Ba1tgh111an, I67 Ill. App. 430; Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brew-
ing Co., I03 Mo. 578; Shrfoer v. Craft, I66 Ala. I46. For complete list, see 
WILI,IS'tON ON CoNTRAC'l'S, Sec. 130. The contrary view is followed in a 
few jurisdictions, upon the ground that the new agreement is elected by the 
promissor in place of an action for damages for refusal of proni.isee to per-
form the first contract,-Parrot v. Mexican Ry., 207 Mass. I84; Evans v. 
Oregon & Wash. R. R. Co., 58 Wash. 429 (but see I6 MICH. L. Rsv. Io6); 
or that the new contract is evidence of the abrogation of the old one and 
that it is the same as if no previous contract had been made,-Coyner v. 
Lynde, IO Ind. 282; Goebel v. Limi, 47 Mich. 489; Evans v. Oregon & Wash. 
R.R. Co., 58 Wash. 429; Rollins v. Marsh-, 128 Mass. n6; or that the new 
contract is an attempt to mitigate the damages flowing from the breach of 
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the first,-Em!riss v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 49 Mich. 279· New York has fol-
lowed the general rule in the later cases,-Weed v. Spears, 193 N. Y. 28g; 
Kuhmarker Mfg. Co. v. Hills, 146 N. Y: Supp. 1013; and professes to follow 
it in the principal case. The New York courts would not admit the com-
petency of the second agreement impliedly to rescind the first,-Obrentz v. 
Wesenfelcl, 103 N. Y. Misc. 664 (dictum), and principal case; nor would it 
recognize a consideration in the second without a rescission of the first. 
Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392; Obrentz v. Wesenfeld, 103 N. Y. Misc. 
664; Price v. Press Pub. Co., 117 N. Y. App. Div. 854. But the court says 
that although a rescission of the first contract is necessary to the finding of 
a legal consideration in the second, yet it matters not whether such rescis-
sion is before or at the time of the making of the second agreement, so long 
as it is express. It may, perhaps, be granted that a logical basis for finding 
consideration would exist by virtue of this "simultaneous rescission," in 
that promisee accepted a new contract in place of the old one, which might 
be construed as legal detriment. But on broad policy there would seem to 
be a weakness in the reasoning which found a legal detriment in the substi-
tution of a right to $125 per month for a right to $go per month, and that 
in essence is what it amounted to. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewi11g 
Co., 103 Mo. 578. Professor Williston, in his work on Contracts, gives 
what would seem to be the best rule. To find a consideration in these cases 
he would require that there be a moment of time when both parties are 
freed of their obligations under the first contract, so that each of them 
could refuse to enter into any bargain whatever relating to the same sub-
ject matter; for unless such a moment of time elapse, the total effect of the 
second transaction is that one party promises to do exactly what he is 
already 'contractually bound to do, and the other party promises to give an 
additional compensation or bonus therefor. Wn.LIS'rON ON CoN'rRAC'rS, 
Sec. 130. 
CoN'tRAC'l's-CoNsm~'rloN-ItLUSORY PROMISt.-The plaintiff, a jobber, 
desiring glue for resale only, contracted with the defendant, a glue manu-
facturer, to supply the plaintiff's "requirements" of a certain quality of 
glue for one year. In a suit for failure to supply, it was held, that the con-
tract was void for lack of mutuality. Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter 
Cooper's Glue Factory, (N. Y., 1921), 132 N. E. 148. 
In such cases the mutuality of consideration depends on the meaning 
given the word "requirements,'' the court in the principal case interpreting 
it as "that which is demanded." Thus, it was pointed out that the plaintiff 
had not obligated itself to do more than what it wanted to do. A similar 
result was reached where the plaintiff, a foundry concern, contracted with 
the defendant to supply all the pig iron "wanted" by plaintiff in its business. 
Bailey et al. v. Austria1i, 19 Minn. 535. On the other hand, where the vendee 
was engaged in a business requiring the article contracted for, the contract 
has often been upheld on another interpretation of "requirements," viz., 
express or implied promises to take what was actually needed in the business. 
Wells v. Alerandre, 130 N. Y. 642; E. G. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 
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Mich. 591; Minn. Lmnber Co. v. The Whitebreast Coal Co., 16o Ill. 85; 
Nat. Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., no Ill. 427; Manhattan Oil Co. v. 
Richardso1i Liebricating Co., II3 Fed. 923; Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar 
Co., 247 Fed. 958, noted in IS MICH. L. ruv. 441; Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 
N. Y. 88. As to the quantity which the vendee may require from the vendor, 
some courts have allowed increases over the usual demands when such 
increases were within the "legitimate requirements of the business." E. G. 
Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., supra; N. Y. Cent. Iron Works Co. v. U. S. 
Radiator C<J., 174 N. Y. 33I. In the last case the court denied that the 
vendee should be allowed to use the contractl in a speculative manner, assert-
ing that the increase should be for the "ordinary and regular business pur-
;POSes." At the same time, it was admitted that the "needs of the vendee 
could be indefinitely enlarged when the market was in such a condition as 
to enable it to undersell its competitors because of the favorable contract 
with the vendor." Just where the line should be drawn depends largely on 
the circumstances of each case, and certainly in the principal case the court 
arrived at an equitable result, though not proceeding on the grounds of cer-
tain other courts. For further discussion of this problem, see 18 MICH. L. 
ruv. 409. 
CoNTRACTS-lLr.EGALITY-R.lGHTS oF !NNOcENT PROMlSF;~-An order pro-
mulgated under the Defense of the Realm Act prohibited the purchase and 
sale of linseed oil by one who had not procured a license. P, who had a 
license, contracted to sell linseed oil to D, being induced to do so through 
D's false representations to the effect that he (D) also had a license. In 
an action by P to recover the amount of an award of damages for breach 
of contract, made by arbitrators, held, that the contract was illegal and that 
no claim under it could be enforced by anyone in a court of law. Mahmoud 
and Ispahani, In re, [1921], 2 K. B. 716. 
While it is often said that an illegal contract is void, it may well be 
doubted whether this statement is strictly accurate. It would seem to be 
more nearly correct to say that such a contract is unenforcible at t..lie suit 
of one who participated in the wrongdoing. Lord Mansfield put the matter 
thus: 
"The principle of public policy is this: ex dolo 1nalo non orit!lr 
actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of 
action upon an immoral or an illegal act." Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 
34I, 343. 
To the same effect, see Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, UI U. S. 597. 
Thall a promisee who is justifiably innocent may recover damages for breach 
of an agreement that is illegal on grounds of public policy has frequently 
been decided. Millward v. Littlewood, 5 Ex. 775; Kelley v. Riley, 106 .Mass . 
.339; Waddell v. Wallace, .32 Okla. 140; Carter v. Ri1iker, I74 Fed. 882; Mus-
son v. Fales, 16 Mass. 331. No reason is apparent why the same rule should 
not be applied in the .case of an aireement made illegal by statute in the 
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absence of an express provision making the contract void. In support of 
this view, see Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232; G11ibs & Sterrett Mfg. 
Co. v. Brncker, supra; McCardie, J., in Brightman & Co. v. Tate, [1919], 
I K. B. 463, 472. 
CoNTRAC'l'S-THIRD PAR'l.'Y BENEFICIARY IN MICHIGAN.-Plaintiff's mother 
was dead. After considerable talk between plaintiff's father and Miss Car-
penter, testatrix herein, it was agreed, in 1868, by the father that she should 
take plaintiff to live with her. It was agreed ·by Miss Carpenter that she 
would board, clothe and educate plaintiff until he was of age, and would 
give him everything she owned when she was through with it. Plaintiff was 
consulted, and consented. He was then seven years of age. He lived with 
Miss Carpenter until his marriage, and for the many years thereafter until 
her death gave her the care and attention of a son. She died in 1919, testate, 
having given all her property to others than the plaintiff, the bulk of it to 
the American Baptist Publication Society. Plaintiff brought this bill, asking 
specific performance of the above contract, and that he be decreed owner 
of all the realty and personalty of which Miss Carpenter died· seized and 
possessed. Held, plaintiff was a party to the contract and to the considera-
tion, and since the contract had been fully performed on his part is entitled 
to specific performance. Bassett v. American Baptist P1tblication Society, 
(Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 747. 
The court specifically denies that it is giving relief to a third party 
beneficiary, but states that there was such privity of contract between Miss 
Carpenter, plaintiff's father and plaintiff as to entitle plaintiff to maintain 
this suit, citing Preston v. Preston, 207 Mich. 681. See 18 MICH. L. R.i>v. 58. 
Preston v. Preston, supra, and the Michigan decisions on third party bene-
ficiary cases in general are very fully reviewed in 18 MICH. L. Riw. ~18. 
Cru:MEs-SuFF1cmNCY oF INDIC'l'MENT.-Defendant was indicted under a 
statute prohibiting the placing of anything "on any railroad in this state 
calculated to obstruct, overthrow or direct from the track of such railroad 
any car," etc. The indictment alleged the placing upon the "tract" of the 
railroad of an obstruction calculated "to overthrow and direct from the 
track'' the cars, etc. The lower court entered a judgment on a demurrer 
to the indictment. Held, the use of "tract" instead of "track'' did not render 
the indictment bad, and the judgment should be reversed. State v. Warfield, 
(Md., 1921), II4 Atl. 835. 
The court put its opinion on two grounds; first, that the statute pro-
hibited placing obstructions on the "railroad," not specifically on the track 
thereof, and that "on the tract" was a proper allegation; second, that if 
"tract" were really intended to be "track," and was a mere mistake in spell-
ing, such mistake could mislead no one. It is regrettable that such obvi-
ously harmless error can still be even thought of as a defense; but the 
decision is a relief from those such as Evans Y. State, 34 Tex. Cr. no, to 
the effect that the use of "possion" instead of "possession" rendered the 
indictment bad, despite its obvious contextual meaning; or Commonwealth 
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v. M cLoott, 5 Gray (Mass.) 91, quashing an indictment because "A. D." was 
omitted from the date; or Harwell v. State, 22 Tex. App. 251, to the effect 
that a written verdict of "guity" is not equivalent to one of "guilty." There 
seems to be developing a much fairer interpretation of what the court in 
West brook v. State, - Tex. Cr. App. -, 227 S. W. no4, calls "the sensible 
proposition that incorrect grammar, bad spelling, bad handwriting, the use 
of words not technically in their correct sense or places will none of them 
make an indictment bad unless same causes the thing intended to be 
charged to lack of sense or certainty." 
CRIMINAL LAw-Evm1wcE-lLLEGAL SEARCH AND Sm:zURE.-Defendant 
was convicted of violation of the state liquor law upon evidence obtained 
under a search warrant conforming to an unconstitutional search and seizure 
law. Before trial a demand was made for the return of the property seized 
and an application for an order directing its return was denied. Held, con-
viction should be set aside. People v. Le Vasseur (Mich., 1921), I82 N. W. 60. 
The unconstitutionality of the statute in question (Act No. 53, Sec. 25, 
P. A. I9I9) was decided in People v. De La Mater, (Michr, l92I), 182 N. 
W. 57. In the instant case the Michigan court shows no disposition to 
question the doctrine laid down in People v. Marxhaiuen, 204 Mich. 559, 
which followed the respectable, though often questioned, authority of Boyd 
v. United States, n6 U. S. 6!6, and Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 
L. R. A., l9I5 B, 834 See I9 MICH. L. Rsv. 355, and 9 ILL. L. Rsv. 43. 
When the objection is first made at the trial the cases are agreed that the 
evidence is admissible, no matter how obtained, partly, at least, on the 
theory that the court will not halt the trial to determine collateral matters. 
Adams l· New York, I92 U. S. '585; People v. Aldorfer, I64 Mich. 676. It 
may be suggested, however, that the court does exactly that whenever the 
admissibility of evidence depends upon a collateral question; e. g., whether a 
confession offered in evidence is free and voluntary. It would seem, if the 
chief concern is to protect the defendant's constitutional rights rather than 
to determine his innocence or guilt, that the question might be raised at any 
time. As was well said by the Supreme Court of Kansas : 
"The federal Constitution was not framed for the special protec-
tion of those who violate statutes, but for the good of the entire 
citizenship." State v. Missouri Pac. Ry., g6 Kan. 6og. 
It is submitted that the defendant's proper remedy is not immunity from 
punishment for crime, but a civil action against the trespassing officers. For 
a full discussion and large collection of cases, see WIGMORS ON EVIDENCE, 
§2264. See also supra, p. 93. 
CRIMINAL LAW-MISTAKE OF FACT AS A DEFENSE-BIGAMY.-Defendant 
was indicted for bigamy under a statute providing that whoever, being mar-
ried, shall marry another person during the life of the former husband or 
wife shall be guilty of a felony, unless at the time of the second marriage 
the defendant has obtained a divorce. The defendant, without having 
obtained a divorce, married again during the life of his former wife. As a 
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defense, the defendant set up that he had reasonable grounds to believe, and 
did believe in good faith, that a divorce had been secured. Held, no defense. 
The defendant did the act prohibited by the statute and is guilty of the 
crime without regard to his good faith in contracting the second marriage. 
Re:1: v. Wheat, [1921], 2 K. B. n9. 
The majority of American courts follow the rule as laid down in the 
principal case. People v. Spoor, 235 !11. 230; Russell v. State, 66 Ark. 185; 
7 CORPUS Jurus, page n65, and cases there cited. In several American juris-
dictions, however, where the statute is practically identical with the English 
statute, it is held that a bona fide belief on reasonable grounds that a divorce 
had been granted. is a defense. Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459; Baker v. State, 
86 Neb. 775. These jurisdictions hold that the statute must be interpreted 
in the tight of the common law rule that before there can be a crime there 
must be a guilty mind, and if one is reasonably misled by circumstances 
which, if true, would make the act for which the prisoner is indicted an 
innocent act, he is not guilty. This general principle is laid down in Qi1eeii 
v. Tolson, [1889], 23 Q. B. Div. 168, but the court in the principal case 
refused to follow it on the ground that it was not in point. In that case 
the defendant was indicted for bigamy under the same statute, to which 
there was a proviso that the act did not include any person whose husband 
or wife had been continually absent from home for seven years and was 
not known by such person to have been living within that time. Defendant's 
husband had been away from home for less than seven years; but the defend-
ant, thinking her husband to be dead, married again. Defendant's 
former husband was in fact alive at the time. Upon indictll)ent the court 
held the defendant not guilty because she bona fide and reasonably believed 
her husband dead. Defendant came clearly within the words of the statute, 
because she did marry before her former husband was in fact dead, or 
before she could legally consider him dead. But the court in the principal 
case said that the defendant in Qi1een v. Tolson, supra, did not intend to 
do the act prohibited by the statute, because she believed on reasonable 
grounds that her husband was dead, while the defendant in the principal case 
did intend to do the act prohibited by the statute, regardless of his good 
faith in contracting the second marriage. The distinction is difficult to see. 
CRIMINAL LAw-M1s'l'An oP FAC'l' AS A D.mmNs&-CRIMINAL INTENT.-
The Larceny Act of 1861 provides that "Whosoever shall unlawfully and 
wilfully kill * * * any house dove or pigeo,n under such circumstances as 
shall not amount to larceny at common law" shall be liable to a penalty. 
D admitted the killing, but stated in his answer that, when he shot it, he 
thought the pigeon was a wild one which he might lawfully kill. Held, 
admitting statement of D to be true, it is no defense. Horton v. Gwymz,e, 
[1921], 2 K. B. 661. 
The general rule is that evil intent is requisite to make an act criminal, 
and mistake of fact, if honest and reasonable, is a good defense. 1 BISHOP 
CRIM. LAW, Sec. 301; BISHOP, S'l'A'l'U'tORY Clu?iuis, Secs. 132, 1022. The only 
serious exception to this rule is in the case of acts mala prohibita, where, 
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in the exercise of the police powers of the state, the legislature enacts a 
statute, for the protection of the public health, welfare or morals, merely 
prohibiting an othenvise lawful act without reference to intent. ·Even in 
such cases some courts read "knowingly" into the statute and permit the 
defense of mistake of fact. Gordon v. State, s2 Ala. 3o8; Sqnire v. State, 46 
Ind. 4S9; Stem v. State, S3 Ga. 229; Farrell v. State, 32 Oh. St. 4s6; Reg. v. 
Sleep, 8 Cox C. C. 472. However, the trend of modern authority is towards a 
literal interpretation of such statutes. People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442; Com. v. 
Mixer, 207 Mass. 14r, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467; Welch v. State, r4s Wis. 86; 
People v. D'Antonio, ISON. Y. App. Div. IOQ; Walters v. State, 174 Ind. 54s; 
People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333. See also Re~ v. Wheat, [1921], 2 K. B. 
n9, and the note thereon, sitpra. But where the legislature uses the word 
"knowingly," "wilfully," or some other word of similar import, the cases 
appear to be uniform in requiring proof of guilty intent and permitting 
mistake of fact to excuse. Com. v. Flamielly, Sr Mass. 195; Masters v. U. 
S., 42 D. C. App. 3so; State v. Snyder, 44 Mo. App. 429; Verona Central 
Cheese Co. v. Mttrtaitgh, so N. Y. 314; Brown v. State, 137 Wis. 543; Brow1i 
v. State, 43 Tex. 478; Bo11ke1· v. People, 37 Mich. 4- That the word "wil-
fully" as employed in statutory criminal law necessarily implies a guilty 
mind, see Withers v. Steamboat El Paso, 24 Mo. 204; Browi~ v. State, 137 
Wis. 543; Masters v. U. S., sitpra; Kendall v. State, 9 Ga. App. 794- In 
reversing the decision of the justices in the instant case, the court say in 
effect that because the killing was not accidental and D admittedly shot 
intending to kill that particular bird, the act was both 'wilful and unlawful." 
'!'he dictim~ in, one case was the only authority cited. Taylor v. N ewinan, 4 
E. & S. 89. There P's pigeons were in the habit of feeding on D's crops, 
and D, after giving P warning, shot one of them while so feeding, believing 
he had a right to do so. As a conviction was quashed in that case, Judge 
Mellor saying, "I think that it was not intended to apply to a case in which 
there was no guilty mind, and where the act was done by a person under 
the honest belief that he was exercising a right,'' it is at least doubtful 
authority for the conclusion arrived at by the court in the instant case. It 
is submitted that neither reason nor authority justifies the strict view taken 
by the court in refusing to admit mistake of fact, with the usual qualifica-
tions, as a defense. The statute is not in the nature of a police regulation 
designed in the interest of the public, and it expressly gives scope to the 
criminal intent. 
CRIMINAL LAw-TruAr.s-RJ,:coMMltNDA'tION o-P Mimcv.-An Ohio statute 
(Gen. Code, Sec. ·12,400) provides that "whoever * * * kills another is guilty 
of murder in the first degree and shall be punished by death unless the jury 
trying the accused recommend mercy, in which case the punishment shall 
be imprisonment in the penitentiary during life." In a prosecution for mur-
der in the first degree the court charged the jury "to consider and determine 
whether or not, in view of all the circumstances and facts leading ttP to and 
attending tne alleged homicide as discfosed by the evidence, you should or 
:;hould not make such recommendation." The charge was objected to on 
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the ground that in the portion italicized the court invaded the function of 
the jury. On error, it was held (Robinson and Wanamaker, J]., dissenting) 
that the instruction was proper. Howell v. State, (Ohio, 1921), 131 N. E. 7o6. 
The dissenting judges took the view that by the action of the legislature 
there had been vested in the jury, so far as choice between punishment by 
death and life imprisonment was concerned, a discretion wholly unlimited 
and beyond the court's control. They also disagreed with the majority in 
the interpretation of Winsto1i v. ·united States, 172 U. S. 303, 19 Sup. Ct. 212, 
43 L. Ed. 456, a case much relied upon in the prevailing opinion, and in which 
are to be found pronouncements favoring each side. The weight of authority 
is probably with the court's decision. Inma1i v. State, 72 Ga. 269; D1mca1i 
v. State, 141 Ga. 4; State v. Bates, 87 S. C. 431; State v. Carrigan, (N. J.), 
I08 Atl. 315. Squarely opposed to the prevailing view is Vickers v. United 
States, l Okl. Cr. 452. Among the cases that may be cited as supporting the 
dissent, but which are found on close examination to be either mere dictum 
or standing merely for the doctrine that the court must not attempt to tell 
the jury how to exercise their discretion, are People v. Kamamm, no Cal. 
609 (see People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256; People v. Rogers, 163 Cal. 476); 
State v. Thome, 39 Utah 2o8 (see State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135); State 
v. Ellis, g8 Oh. St. 21. Since the judge in cases where the legislature has 
fixed only minimum and maximum penalties exercises an uncontrollable and 
unreviewable discretion in passing sentence, it is reasonably arguable that 
the jury in such a situation as was presented in the principal case should 
have a like freedom: if the judge in the former case may be guided in 
fixing sentence by what has come to him, let us say, in a vision, why should 
the jury in the latter case be confined to the facts and circumstances of the 
case as disclosed by the evidence? 
INSURAN<:i;-E:e~cr oF D~TH oF INSUR$> Bin'orut Tim Pwon SPEcmnm 
BY TH£ "INCONTESTADU.ITY" Cr.A USE ExPIRES.-An insurance policy read: 
"This policy shall be incontestable after one year from its date except for 
non-payment of premiums." The insured died within the year. Action wm 
brought on the policy and the insurer defended, alleging false warranties 
of the insured in answering questions material to the risk. The answer was 
not filed until after one year from the date of the policy. Plaintiff contended 
that the defense was barred by the operation of the above clause. Defendant 
contended that the rights of the parties became fixed at the death of the 
insured, and since the policy was then contestable it should continue so indefi-
nitely; hence, false warranties should avoid the policy. Held, admitting the 
existence of fraud, the clause continued operative after the death of the 
insured, the time within which to contest the policy had expired, and plaintiff 
may recover. Plotner v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., (N. D., 
1921), 183 N. w. IOOO. 
The question involved is nearly new. It is well settled that the "incon-
testable" clause will bind the insurer even in the face of fraud if the period 
stipulated has run before the death of the insured. See cases cited in 6 A. 
L. R. 448. But when, as in the principal case, the insured dies before the 
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period expires, there are two possible conclusions, first, that the clause con. 
tinues operative, thus compelling the insurer to contest the policy within the 
agreed period if at all, or second, that the rights of all the parties to the 
contract become fixed and determined at the death of the insured, and if 
the policy is then contestable it will remain so indefinitely. Authority in 
point is meagre, but that which exists clearly favors the former alternative. 
In Priulential !11.surance Co. v. Lear, 31 App. D. C. 184, the insured died 
within the stipulated period. In discussing the case the court used language 
which clearly indicated that in their minds the clause continued operative 
after his death. However, the decision for the plaintiff did not turn on the 
point, for the defendant failed in his proof of fraud. In Monahan v. Metro-
politan Li{ e Insurance Co., 180 Ill. App. 390, the appellate court adopted the 
second alternative and held that the rights of the parties became fixed as 
they stood at the death of the insured. However, this ruling was reversed 
when the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court (n9 N. E. 68), the court 
saying that to limit the operation of the incontestability clause by requiring 
the agreed period to expire during the life of the insured, if at all, was 
unwarrantably to read additional words into the policy. Recently, in Ram-
sey v. Old Colotiy Life Inrnrance C-0., (Ill., 1921), 131 N. E. 108, the earlier 
supreme court decision was followed, and it may now be regarded as settled 
law in Illinois that the incontestability clause continues operative no matter 
when the insured may die. In Ebner v. Ohio St<tf:e Life Insurance Co., 
(Ind.), 121 N. E. 315, the same question arose upon a bill in equity for 
cancellation of a policy. for fraud brought by the insurer after the death 
of the insured, but two days before the expiration of the period stipulated. 
The court in decreeing cancellation said that although ordinarily a bill in 
equity would not lie after the death of the insured because the insurer had 
an adequate defense at law to an action on the policy, yet in this case the 
remedy at law was not adequate because the incontestability period was still 
running. The beneficiary might not sue on the policy until after the stipu-
lated period had expired. So this case necessarily supports the Illinois 
decisions and in addition the court expressly cites them with approval. 
''Incontestability" clauses are becoming increasingly numerous. They make 
good selling arguments for insurance agents. Furthermore, they are now 
required by statute in many states. It is to be expected that more cases in 
point will soon appear. A reasonable construction of the plain words of 
such clauses demands that the conclusion of the principal case prevail unless 
the clause expressly provides that the agreed period shall run its course 
during the lifetime of the insured. 
LAW OF NATIONS-CONFISCATION OF ENEMY PRIVATE PROPE:RTY-\VHE:N 
UsAGE DE:VEI.OPS INTO BINDING CusToM.-After the conclusion of the armis-
tice between Great Britain and Bulgaria, an inquisition was held and 
certain stocks and securities belonging to Ferdinand, former Tsar of Bul-
garia, were declared forfeited to the Crown. Ferdinand appealed. Held, 
that the Crown has the right, under the common law, to seize and forfeit 
enemy private property found within the realm, but that this common law 
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right has been superseded by the Trading with the Enemy Acts. In re 
Ferdinand, ex-Tsar of Bulgaria, [1921], I Ch. 107. 
The derivation of a rule from modern international usage had more 
to commend it in this case than in The Marie Le01ilza;dt, infra. The usage 
had developed over a longer period and with more uniformity. Beginning 
at least as early as the sixteenth century, the rule that enemy private prop-
erty within the country is subject to confiscation was gradually mitigated. 
Through municipal legislation, treaties, and common usage the practice 
developed of permitting enemies to remove, dispose of, or retain their prop-
erty. There was no important instance of confiscation during the century 
which preceded the World War. There was also an impressive accumula-
tion of theoretical opinion, including most Europ~an writers, in support of 
the alleged rule against confiscation. See CORBETT, LEADING CASES, [3rd Ed.], 
II, 61-2. The attitude of the courts, however, remained conser\.ative. The 
old rule was asserted as late as the end of the seventeenth century. Attor-
ney-General v. Weeden, (1699), Parker 267. At tne beginning of the nine-
teenth century it was doubted whether the usage, apart from statute or 
treaty, had actually developed into a binding custom. Jolmso1i v. Twenty-
One Bales, (1814), 13 Fed. Cas. 855. It was held by the Supreme Court of 
the United States that war does not of itself work a confiscation, but said 
that war gives the right to confiscate. Brow1i v. United States, (I8I4), 8 
Cr. no. Lord Ellenborough's decision in Wiolff v. Oxholm, (I8I7), 6 M. 
& S. 92, holding the Danish confiscatory ordinance contrary to the law of 
nations and void, was certainly anomalous and probably unsound from every 
point of view. In the twentieth century the outstanding event in this con-
nection was the return to earlier practice in the treaties of peace at the end 
of the World War. See GARNER, !N'l'. LAW AND 'tHE WoRLD WAR, I, ch. 4; 
SCHUSTER, THE PEACE TREATY IN ITS EFFECTS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, BRITISH 
YEAR BooK OF !NT. LAW (I920-21), I67. The instant case concedes living 
force to the same harsh principle. · It has been assailed as reactionary and 
dangerous. See 30 YALE L. JouR. 845. But could the court safely have done 
otherwise than take the conservative position? While a supernational trib-
unal, had one existed, might well have derived a rule from modern inter-
national usage, it is not apparent that a national court under such circum-
stances can be expected to adventure so advanced a decision. Does not the 
criticism misconceive the function of national courts? See PICCIOTTO, RELA-
TION OF INT. LAW TO 'tHE LAW OF ENGLAND AND OF 'tH:E UNIT:ED STATES, ch. 5 
and passim. 
LAW OF NA'.UONS-EFFECT OF CONCLUSION OF PEAC:E ON PROPERTY SUBJECT 
To CONDEMNATION AS PRIZE-STATUS oF FREE CITY OF DANZIG.-At the out-
break of the war between Great Britain and Germany, three ships belonging 
to a Danzig corporation were seized as prize in British ports. Upon the 
conclusion of peace, the treaty reserved to the allied powers the right to 
retain and liquidate the property of German nationals within their terri-
tories, "including territories ceded to them by the present treaty," with a 
proviso that "German nationals who acquire ipso facto the nationality of 
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an allied or associated power in acdordance with the provisions of the present 
treaty, will not be considered as German nationals." TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 
Part X, s. rv, art. 297, para. (b). The treaty also ceded the territory of 
Danzig to the principal allied and associated powers to be constituted a Free 
City. Part III, s. XI, arts. IOO-Io8. The Danzig owners of the ships asked 
restoration and compensation, contending that they were not to be consid-
ered German nationals within the meaning of the treaty provisions. Held, 
that the ships must be condemned. Apart from the treaty, the conclusion 
9f peace and the transfer of the claimants' allegiance to the Free City of 
Danzig did not revest property which became subject to condemnation during 
the war. The claimants were German nationals within the meaning of the 
treaty provisions. The Blonde and Other Ships, [192I], P. 155. 
As regards neutral vessels captured during war, it has been a moot ques-
tion whether they may be condemned after the conclusion of peace. Com-
pare 0PPENHEn.r, INT. LAW, 2d ed., II, 436, and The Doelwyk, Martens, No1t-
vea1' Recueil General, 2d Ser., XXVIII, 66, 85 (Italy, 1896). Enemy vessels, 
on the other hand, can hardly escape the decree of condemnation because 
peace has intervened. The Blonde, supra.; I :K:eNT, COMMENTARIES, 173. 
Nor does there appear to be any good reason for differentiating the case 
of German claimants who have become subjects of the Free City of Danzig 
from the case of those who have remained subjects of Germany. The 
Marie Leonhardt, [192I], P. I. Furthermore, as a matter of treaty inter-
pretation, it seems clear that the claimants were not German nationals who 
had acquired ipso facto the nationality of an allied or associated power. 
But the court went on to support its interpretation by emphasizing the 
notion that Danzig has been constituted "a new sovereign power'' with an 
international status independent of Poland. This is the merest fiction. 
While it has been asserted on behalf of the allied and associated powers 
that the inhabitants of Danzig "form no part of the Polish state" (13 AM. 
JouR. INT. LAW, 545, 549), the Treaty of Versailles (Art. 1o8), nevertheless, 
anticipates that Poland, in addition to its control of commerce and trans-
portation, will "undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free 
City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of the City 
when abroad." If the court desired to consider the international status of 
Danzig, it ought to have given due weight to these facts. 
LAW OF NATIONS-ENEMY ~RCHANT SHIPS IN PORT AT OUTBREAK OF 
WAR-WHEN USAGE DEVELOPS INTO BINDING CusToM.-A German steamship 
was seized in the port of London at the outbreak of war. Aftet the con-
clusion of peace the owners claimed the release of the ship on the ground 
that there is a customary rule of the law of nations, binding on prize courts, 
which requires a belligerent to allow enemy merchant ships within its ports 
at the outbreak of war a reasonable period of time in which to depart. Held, 
that enemy merchant ships in port at the outbreak of war are liable to seizure 
and condemnation as prize. The Marie Leonhardt, [1921], P. I. 
Usage is an important source of the law of nations as recognized and 
applied by the courts. The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677. But when, to 
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borrow the figure- of Pitt Cobbett, does a random route across a common 
acquire the character of an acknowledged path? When does usage crystal-
lize into binding custom? The answer was not difficult in the principal case. 
In 1782 Lord Mansfield had asserted the rule to be that "upon the declara-
tion of war, or hostilities, all the ships of the enemy are detained in our 
ports, to be confiscated as the property of the enemy, if no reciprocal agree-
ment is made." Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 612 n., 615 n. Subsequently, the 
usage of nations became somewhat more lenient. Upon the outbreak of the 
Crimean War in 1854, the belligerent governments allowed liberal periods 
in which enemy merchant ships in their ports might depart without hin-
drance. See The Plzamix, Spink's P. C. l. A similar practice was observed 
at the beginning of each of the principal wars of the ensuing half century. 
Thus, the United States granted thirty days at the outbreak of the war with 
Spain, liberally construed in the case of Tlze Buena Ventura, 175 U. S. 384-
As regards details, however, the practice was not unifonn. And the granting 
of a period seems to· have been commonly regarded as an act of grace. An 
attempt to agree upon a common rule at The Hague in 1907 was unsuccess-
ful. Great Britain, France, Japan, and the Argentine voted against a pro-
posal to recognize the usage as obligatory. The convention drafted was an 
unsatisfactory compromise. It was never signed by the United States. See 
HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CoNFSRENCES, 295-307. At the beginning of the 
World War the granting of a period depended in most instances upon recip-
rocal agreement. There was no uniformity as regards either the principle 
or the details of its application. See GARNER, INT. LAW AND THE WORLD 
WAR, I, ch. 6. "There was thus an inchoate usage of exemption, although 
it was not either sufficiently uniform or sufficiently long established to rank 
as an obligatory custom." COBBETT, LEADING CASES, [3rd Ed.], II, 167. 
LAW OF NATIONS-NATIONAUTY-STATEI.ESSNESS.-The plaintiff was dis-
charged from German nationality in 18¢. He settled in England, but was 
never naturalized, nor did he ever acquire nationality in any other country. 
He sued for a declaration that he was not a German national within the 
meaning of treaty clauses providing that the property of German nationals 
might be charged with the payment of certain claims. Held, that he was 
entitled to the declaration. "Statelessness" is recognized in English munici-
pal law. Semble, that it is recognized in the law of nations. Stoeck v. Pub-
lic Trustee, [I921], 2 Ch. 67. 
Whether the status of no nationality is recognized in 'English municipal 
law has been questioned but never before decided. A few years ago Lord 
Phillimore seems to have doublled whether such a status had been recog-
~ized in any system of law. Ex parte Weber, [1916], l K B. 28o, 283. In 
the same case the House of Lords left the question open. [I9I6], l A. C. 42I. 
No cases have been found on the point in American reports. See HuBERICH, 
TRADING WITH THE EN£MY, 86-9. Whether the status is conceivable from 
the point of view of the law of nations has been controverted. See BOR-
CHARD, DIPI.OMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD, II, 262; OPPENHEIM, 
INT. LAw, [3rd Ed.], I, 3II-13. Assuming that the court was justified in 
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finding, from the evidence in the case, that the plaintiff had lost his German 
nationality for all purposes, the decision that he was "stateless" in English 
law seems to have been fully warranted by the logic of the situation. The 
dictum that "statelessness" is recognized in the law of nations will be gen-
erally approved. 
MASTER AND S:eitvANT-MAsT:eit's DuTY To PRovmi> SAFE INSTRUMENT.ALI-
'l'IES-DEFECTIVJ> MOTOR CAR SUPPLIED FOR Us-e OF S:eitvANT.-The plaintiff, 
an employe of the defendant, was given an automobile for use in his mas-
ter's business. The starting mechanism of the car was defective. Plaintiff 
complained, but nothing was done. Plaintiff remained in the defendant's 
employment and continued to use the automobile. While attempting to crank 
the car the plaintiff was injured. It was contended that he had assumed the 
risk. Held, that plaintiff had not necessarily assumed the risk by remaining 
in the defendant's employment :after learning of the defect. It was a ques-
tion for the jury. Baker v. James Brothers & Son.s, [192I]. 2 K B. 6g4 
The early English rule held that a servant who continued to work after 
knowledge of the risk lost his right to sue for resulting injury. Griffiths v. 
London & St. Katharine Docks Cc., (I884), I3 Q. B. 259. The modern 
English rule holds that knowledge of the risk does not necessarily require, 
as a conclusion· of law, that the servant assumes the risk, but it is a question 
for the jury. S11iith v. Baker, (I8g1), L. R., 16 App. Cases 325; Baker v. 
James Brothers & Sons, supra. The majority of American courts follow 
the early English rule. Lamson v. American Axe Co., (1900), I77 Mass. 144; 
Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Lopsley, (1907), 76 Kan. 103; Santiago v. 
Walsh Stevedore Co., (1912), 137 N. Y. Supp. 6u. The North Carolina 
court, however, follows the present English doctrine. Lloyd v. Hanes & Co., 
(1900), 126 N. C. 359. Professor Bohlen states this to be the only court 
following Smith v. Baker in America. See 20 HARV. L. REY. no. The modern 
English doctrine of treating the question as one of fact for the jury appeals 
more to one's sense of justice. 
I 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCES-QUESTIONING VALIDITY BY MAN-
DAMUS.-A city ordinance provided that no one should carry on the busi-
ness of selling jewelry within the city unless he first obtain a license from 
the mayor. No rules or directions were laid down for the guidance of the 
mayor, except that he should require a certain bond of the applicant. Plain-
tiff applied for such license, which was refused. He then applied for man-
damus to compel the issuance of the license, and also denied the validity 
of the ordinance. Held, two justices dissenting, the question of constitu-
tionality was not before the court, and the ordinance gives the mayor full 
discretion to grant or not to grant such license; hence, a writ of mandamus 
should not be granted. Samuels v. Couzens, (Mich., 1921), I83 N. W. 925. 
The ordinance attempts the regulation of a business which may be car-
ried on as a matter of right, and which the city could not entirely prohibit. 
As interpreted by the court, it gives the mayor full discretion to grant or 
RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS II7 
refuse a license and does not lay down the conditions by which he shall be 
governed. It would seem, therefore, very clearly unconstitutional, as deny-
ing the equal protection of the laws, and therefore conflicting with the Four-
teenth Amendment, or as being a delegation of legislative power. Yick W o 
v. H-0pki11s, 118 U. S. 356; Walsh v. City of Denver, II Colo. App. 523; 
Smith v. Hosford, Io6 Kan. 363; City of Richmond v. House, I77 Ky. 8I4; 
Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 24I; F~UND, Por.ICS PowsR, 667-670. 
In Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 3g6, the court held an unregulated discretion 
in the mayor, to permit or prohibit parades on the streets, invalid. But, as 
the plaintiff asks relief under the ordinance, he cannot question its validity 
in this action. The cases are all but unanimous on this point. Mandamus 
cases in which the relator is permitted to raise the question of constitution-
ality are those wherein he attacks another statute which, if valid, would 
excuse the respondent from performance. Von Hoffmat~ v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 
535; Giddings v. Secretary of State, 93 Mich. I. Hence, if plaintiff wishes 
to test the validity of the ordinance, he should go ahead with his business 
and get himself arrested and fined ! The method is harsh, wasteful of time 
and money, and unfair to the party, but the law now offers him nothing bet-
ter. Flick v. City of Broke1i Bow, 67 Neb. 529. The Michigan Declaratory 
Judgment Law, Act No. I50, P. A, I9I9, might have given plaintiff an ade-
quate and efficient remedy, Dyson v. Atty. Gm., [I9II], I K. B. 4Io, but it 
has been declared unconstitutional. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 
Mich. 592. See I6 MICH. L. REv. 69; I7 MICH. L. REv. 688. I9 MICH. L. REv. 
· 86. I9 MICH. L. REv. 537 discusses a similar statute now in effect in Kansas. 
However, even though plaintiff in the instant case could not insist that the 
constitutional question be considered, the court may indulge in such considera-
tion when the invalidity is clear, although neither party can, or does, insist 
thereon. Welch v. Swasey, I93 Mass. 364; State v. Robins, 71 Ohio St. 273. 
And if, as the court insisted, this be prevented by the rule that if a cause can 
be decided without passing on the constitutional question, such question will 
not be considered, there is another well-known rule applicable to the case, 
namely, that when one interpretation of a statute will make it unconstitu-
tional, whereas another will make it valid, the court will give the latter if 
it can do so without straining the words and evident intent of the legisla-
ture. Upon this ground the dissenting justices contended that the ordinance 
should be construed as giving the mayor no discretion in the matter. 
NscuGSNC$-DU'l'Y TowAIID INFANT ~SPASSSRS-A'l"l'RAC'l'IVS Nur-
SANCl!S.-Defendant caused certain ex'cavations to be made on his premises. 
Plaintiff's child, playing with others around the excavation, was killed when 
the walls caved. In an actioI). for damages it was alleged that the excavation 
was eight feet deep in sandy soil; that defendant knew that because of the 
nature of the soil a cave-in might occur at any time; that he knew the prem-
ises to be attractive to playing children; that he knew that children played 
there, and yet he took no precautions to guard them from danger or to 
warn them. Defendant demurred. Held, demurrer should be overruled. 
Baxter v. Park, (S. D., 1921), 184 N. W-. 198. 
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It is a time-honored doctrine that a property owner owes no duty to 
trespassers other than to avoid wilfully injuring them. He is under no 
obligation to keep his premises safe for them. · But many courts recognize 
as an exception to this doctrine that one who maintains dangerous instru-
mentalities on his premises, with the knowledge that they are likely to 
attract children at play and that the danger wi).1 be latent to their childish 
intellects, owes them the duty of guarding or at least of warning them of 
the danger. The English case, Lynch v. Nitrdin, (1841), I Q. B. 29, was the 
pioneer case pronouncing this exception. In 1873 the U. S. Supreme Court 
followed by applying the new doctrine to a case of injuries caused by a 
railroad turntable, allowing the infant plaintiff to recover, even. though he 
was a trespasser. Railroad v. Stmit, 17 Wall. 657. _Since then hundreds of 
cases have raised the question. Many courts have sanctioned the -doctrine, 
others have disapproved it, and others have subjected it to a storm of crit-
icism. An exhausti~e analysis of the subject and a citation of cases appears 
in 19 L. R A. (N. S.) I094. and the problem is discussed in IS MICH. L. 
RJ;v. 340, and 5 MICH. L. Riw. 64- Specific cases have been noted as they 
were decided in numerous other issues of this Riwn~w. The modern tend-
ency, however, seems to be to restrict the application of the doctrine. Some 
courts refuse to apply it in any case. Reid v. Harm01i, 16! Mich. 51. Some 
limit it strictly to the turntable cases. Railway v. Beavers, II3 Ga. 3g8. 
Others limit it to cases involving attractive and dangerous machinery or explo-
sives. Erickson v. Great Northern R. R., 82 Minn. 60. It is generally said 
that the danger must be latent to the child, although patent to the property 
owner, to impose the duty on the latter, and some courts limit the doctrine 
by imputing to the· child a marvelous perspicacity in discerning danger. But 
some few courts, such as the court in the principal case, adopt the doctrine 
whole-heartedly and compel all property owners to exercise ordinary care 
to guard infant trespassers. In view of the increasing number of attractive 
artificial perils which have been devised by twentieth century ingenuity, the 
doctrine is surely a salutary one, and since the principal case is apparently 
the first case in which the South Dakota court has followed the doctrine of 
Lynch v. Nitrdin, it jg to be commended for coming into the column of courts 
which plac~ modem social considerations above technical property rights. 
Ou, AND GAS-NATURE OF INTtREST HELD BY LESSEE.-In determining the 
amount of tax due under a statute, it became necessary to decide whether 
an oil and gas lease which "granted, demised, leased, and let land for the 
sole purpose of operating for oil and ias" gave the lessee corporeal propertY. 
The Secretary of State excluded such oil leaseholds on the ground that they 
were incorporeal property. In an action in the form of an injunction against 
the Secretary of State to restrain him from turning over to the treasurer 
taxes paid under protest, it was held, that such a lease conveys a freehold 
interest in the realty and is corporeal property. Transc01itinental Oil Co. v. 
E111111erso1~, Secretary of State, (Ill., l92I), l3I N. E. 645. 
Courts of the various states are in confHct in their holdings as to the 
nature of the interest created by an oil and gas lease. First, it. should be 
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noted that there are two principal types of oil and gas leases: that type which 
in terms grants the exclusive right to explore for -0il; and secondly, that 
which grants the land for the sole purpose of searching for oil. The Illinois 
cases, with which the principal case is in accord, hold that under either type 
of cases the lessee holds corporeal property. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 
Ill. 5I8; Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. IOI. See also Woodland Oil Co. v. Craw-
ford, 55 Ohio St. I61; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. u8. Kansas, like 
Illinois, makes no distinction in the types of leases, but contrary to Illinois, 
holds that, regardless of the type of lease, incorporeal property is created. 
Beardsley v. Kati. Nat. Gas Co., 78 Kan. 57I; Huston v. Cox, 103 Kan. 73. 
Pennsylvania and California hold that a lease, which in terms grants the 
land, vests the lessee with a corporeal estate. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 
225 Pa. 338; Chandler v. Hart, 16I Cal. 405. But the rule is settled in these 
two states that if the lease purports to grant only the exclusive right to 
search for oil, then the lessee has an incorporeal right. Funk v. Haldeman, 
53 Pa. 229; Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Oil Co., 156 Cal. 2n. The courts, 
in determining the nature of the interest created by an oil and gas lease, 
should consider the substance rather than the form of the lease. Whatever 
the technical form, the underlying purpose of the lease is to give the lessee 
the right to take oil and gas. All other rights are mere incidents of this 
primary, underlying right. The right to take oil is analagous to the right 
to take gravel, herbage, seaweed, etc., from the land of another-commonly 
termed a profit a prendre. If this analysis is correct, the Kansas courts 
have reached the sound conclusion in holding that an oil lease, regardless of 
its form, creates in the lessee incorporeal property. For a more complete 
review of the cases upon the nature of the lessee's interest under an oil and 
gas lease, see the article on The Law of Oil and Gas, by James A. Veasey, 
18 MICH. L. R£v. 749. 
RESTRIC'tioNs-GeNERAr, Bun.nmG PLAN-UN!FOR:M STYI.E oF Houses AS 
NoTICE.-The owner of a tract of land laid. the same out in lots in pursu-
ance to a community scheme and sold them under certain restrictions and 
the representation that the whole tract was subject to them. One of these 
was to the effect that any dwelling erected should be used as a private home 
for one family only. Later he sold a lot to the defendant under a deed 
restricting the latter to the erection of a building to appear from the outside 
as a one-family house, to be used by not .more than two families. The defend-
ant began to erect a two-family type of house. Seven of the restricted lot 
owners sued to enjoin him from so doing. Held, the nature of the building 
restriction imposed on him and the uniformity of the houses in the restricted 
area were circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry, and 
hence to charge the defendant with notice of the general plan. Shoyer et al. 
v. Mer111elstei1i, (Ct. of Chancery, N. J., I92I), 114 Atl. 788. 
It is well settled that an owner of land may, by contract with the pur-
chasers of successive parcels, affect the remaining parcels with an equity 
requiring them to be occupied in conformity to a general plan, provided that 
each subsequent purchaser is charged with notice of the plan, and regardless 
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of the fact that his legal title is not similarly restricted. See 2 TIFFANY, 
~AL PRuPER'rY, [2nd Ed.], Sec. 400; Tallmadge v. East Rwer Bank, 26 N. 
Y. 105; Knapp v. Hall, 20 N. Y. Supp. 42; Lowrance v. Woods, 54 Tex. Civ. 
App. 233; ChaPi1i v. Dougherty, 165 Ill. App. 426; Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 
464. Naturally, the courts cannot define precisely what circumstances will 
be adequate to put a purchaser upon inquiry as to the existence of a general 
plan. In Tallmadge v. East River Bank, supra, the court said, "The uni-
formity of the position of all the houses on St. Mark's Place was probably 
sufficient alone to put the defendant on inquiry," and in the principal case 
the court said, "That (the uniform style of the houses) alone was, in >.'ly 
judgment, enough to put the defendant to inquiry." In both of these cases, 
however, there were other facts indicating the existence of a general plan. 
In Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. Y. 291, where the buildings in the restricted 
area were generally set back eight feet from the street, though parts of some 
of them encroached upon the space to be left open, the court said, regarding 
their uniform position, "But he (the defendant) was not bound to know 
from that circumstance that there was any binding agreement in reference 
to the open space." It is doubtful whether mere uniformity in style or in 
position should be sufficient to charge a party with notice of a general build-
ing plan. A better rule would seem to be that the uniformity of the houses 
in a restricted area is but one of the circumstances to be considered in deter-
mining whether a reasonable man would have been put upon inquiry. Uni-
formity in style or position might be so distinct as to have this effect. 
SALES-FORM OF ACTION ON BUYER'S ~FUSAL OF Trri.t.-Plaintiff sued 
on an account for goods sold. At the trial defendant was permitted to intro-
duce evidence that he had countermanded his order for the goods before 
plaintiff had shipped them. This was objected to by plaintiff on the ground 
that by the contract the order could not be countermanded and the evidence 
was therefore immaterial. Held, the evidence was properly admitted. Ma~ 
tin & Lanier Paint Co. v. Daniels, (Ga. App., 1921), 108 S. E. 246. 
The court's reason for admitting the evidence was that "while the order 
for the goods sold provided that it was not subject to countermand, "yet if 
the defendant did in fact countermand it before the goods were shipped, 
while this would not relieve him from liability, the plaintiff could not main-
tain an action upon an open account for goods sold and delivered, but would 
have to sue for a breach of contract." The court cites no authority, but the 
facts and decision are on all fours with Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 
255. It is one more decision in disregard of the persistent dictum originated 
in Dustan v. McA11drew, 44 N. Y. 72, to the effect that even though the 
buyer refuses the title the seller may, nevertheless, sue for the price as dis-
tinct from damages for breach of the contract. For a full discussion of the 
subject, see The Seller's Action for the Price, 17. MICH. L. ~v. 283. 
STATU'l'ORY CoNSTRUCTION-~ADING ExctPTION IN'l'O PENAL STATUTE.-
The defendant, who was a motorcycle police officer, while pursuing a speed-
law violator, ran into the plaintiff. The defendant was exceeding the speed 
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limit and running without a light, in violation of the Minnesota Motor 
Vehicle Act. In a civil action for damages, held, defendant was not guilty 
of negligence per se. Edberg v. John-son, (Minn., 1921), 184 N. W. 12. 
The statute involved applied to all vehicles not driven by muscular power, 
except fire department apparatus and police patrol wagons. The court con-
cluded that motorcycle policemen should be classed with drivers of police 
patrol wagons, since they regarded it as unreasonable that the legislature 
would have intended that the prohibitions of the statute should apply to a 
motorcycle police officer who was exceeding the speed limit from necessity 
in the performance of his duty. While this is obviously a decision based 
upon good policy, it appears a very liberal construction of the exceptions 
provided by the statute. Opposed to it, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
held a deputy sheriff guilty of negligence per se when he injured himself 
by running into an obstruction while exceeding the speed limit in pursuit 
of a speeder. The court admitted that the statute should not affect the 
officer, but stated that only the legislature had power to ingraft the excep-
tion. Keevil v. Ponsford, (Texas, 1915), 173 S. W. 518. It has been held 
that chronic addiction to drugs creating symptoms similar to drunkenness 
would not furnish grounds for divorce under a statute which granted divorce 
for drunkenness. Smith v. Smith, (Del., 1919), 105 Atl. 833, 19 Cor,. L. Rsv. 
412. Similarly, the court refused to insert the word "not" into a statute 
purporting to regulate the elevation of the beam of light which could be 
thrown from the headlights of automobiles, when this recourse was neces-
sary to give effect to the legislature's obvious intention. State v. Claiborne, 
(Iowa, 1919), 170 N. W. 417, 17 MICH. L. Rsv. 519. These cases illustrate 
what is said to be the modern attitude of the courts toward statutes: that is, 
to try not to deviate from the expressed intention of the legislature, as dis-
tinguished from the earlier "equitable construction," which often went so 
far as to corre~t the legislative intention to accord with what, in the view 
of the court, should have been the intention. See 58 U. PA. L. R 76-86. 
Some modern cases, however, look further than _the literal meaning of a 
statute, and inquire into the conditions existing at the time of its enactment, 
and the evil sought to be remedied, in order to arrive at the whole legislative 
intent. The United States Supreme Court held that Trinity Church in New 
York, in contracting for the services of a pastor living in England, did not 
violate the Contract Labor Law. The theory of the court was that, although 
the statute contained no exception in that regard, still Congress would not 
have intended that a law which must have been aimed primarily at foreign 
contracts for laborers should include a contract with a minister, especially 
since the policy of the law in this country had always been to foster and 
encourage religion. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457. 
An act making it a misdemeanor wilfully to break down a fence in the pos-
session of another did not apply to a man who had a legal right to the fence 
and the land on which it stood. State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law ¢. A deputy 
sheriff who exceeded the speed limit set by a municipal ordinance, while pur-
suing a felon, was held not subject to prosecution. State of Washingto1i v. 
Gorham, no Wash. 330, 9 A. L. R. 365. In many cases it is said that a 
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statute should be interpreted in the light -0£ sound public policy and reason-
ableness, whenever the intention of the legislature is in doubt, because of 
ambiguity, or where a strict and literal construction would lead to an absurd 
result. Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327; Bowman v. Industrial Commission, 
(1919), 28g Ill. 126. The leading case is in harmony -with these decisions 
and seems progressive, although it is inconsistent with some other cases. 
UNFAIR CoMPETITlON-ScoPE oF POWERS oF FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION 
-DECEPTION OF CONSUMERS NOT UNFAIR COMPE'l'ITION.-A manufacturer of 
underwear, shirts and hosiery labeled these articles as composed of "wool" 
and "merino," when they contained much cotton. While this deceived the 
public, it did not deceive competing manufacturers, among whom such labels 
were used universally. The Federal Trade Commission, after a hearing, 
ordered the company to desist and to label its goods as "wool and cotton" 
or "merino and cotton." Upon petition to revise the order, held, the com-
mission acted without authority and order should be reversed. Winsted 
Hosiery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A., 2nd Circ., 1921), 272 
Fed. 957. 
The common law has afforded no protection simitar to that which the 
Federal Trade Commission attempted to provide by their order. A hand-
book prepared by the Federal Trade Commission for office use classifies the 
methods of competition which the courts have passed upon as to unfairness. 
They include the following: passing off of goods for those of competitor; 
inducing breach of competitor's contracts; intimidating a competitor's cus-
tomers by threats to sue for infringements of patents; enticing employes 
from the service of competitor; defamation of competitor or disparagement 
of his goods; combinations to cut off competitor's supplies; betrayal of trade· 
secrets; and contracts for exclusive dealing. UNFAIR COMPETITION AT THE 
COMMON ~w, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION R.EPoRT, (1916). It is seen that 
none of these include deception of the consumer by false labeling, and the 
only remedy for such an injury has been the private action for fraud. The 
scope of the authority of the Federal Trade Commission, however, is deter-
mined by the statute, and' is not limited by precedents in common law and 
equity. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307. 
Section V, Federal Trade Commission Act, reads as follows: "That unfair 
methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The 
commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partner-
ships, or corporations, except banks and common carriers, from using unfair 
methods of competition in commerce," and the commission is to hold a hear-
ing and issue an order to desist whenever it "shall have reason to believe 
that any person, partnership, or corporation has been using any unfair method 
of competition in commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that 
a proceeding in respect thereof would be of interest to the public." 4 FED. 
STAT. ANN. 577. The decision confines the proceedings of the commission 
to those practices which are not employed generally by all competing traders. 
and which injure other traders by depriving them of an equal opportunity 
of disposing of their goods. The court applies the traditional conception 
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of unfair competition, reasoning that the purpose of the act was to protect 
competing traders, and was not to constitute the Federal Trade Commission 
a censor of commercial morals. The Federal Trade Commission Act was 
made general, however, with the aim that it might be flexible and enable 
the commission to act to the best advantage. A broader construction of its 
purpose would seem reasonable. It would seem that unfair competition 
could reasonably be construed to include any methods by which competing 
traders seek to obtain business for themselves and which deceive the public 
to their injury. In the Sears, Roebuck & Co. case, cited above, the com-
pany was ordered to desist from advertising untruthfully that it was able 
to give lower prices on sugar than competitors because of its exclusive enjoy-
ment of certain markets. This order, it is seen, prohibits as unfair compe-
tition a practice which was never held to be such before the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. In the leading case some reliance was placed upon a 
decision by the Supreme Court that it was not unfair competition to refuse 
to sell cotton ties, the company having control of the market for ties, unless 
the customer also purchased cotton bagging. Federal Tracie Commissio1i v. 
Gratz, (1920), 253 U. S. 421. The acts complained of were judged as to 
their unfairness from the standpoint of the crowding out of other com-
panies. This case did not involve a direct deception of customers as to the 
quality of goods purchased, and the leading case is the first to decide whether 
the commission could prevent this practice. It is clear that such a general 
practice of deception as was involved in the leading case is of genuine 
interest to the public. It should be prevented. Certiorari for review of the 
case has been granted. 41 Sup. Ct. 625. If the decision is sustained upon 
review, further legislation appears desirable. 
WNtEP.s AND WATERCOURSES-RIPARIAN LAND-WA'l'EP.SHED.-Of three 
adjoining tracts of land bordering on a stream, plaintiff, a municipality, 
owned tract B, with a prescriptive right to divert all of the waters of the 
stream. Defendant, owning tract C, abutting on the stream below and 
extending behind the plaintiff's land, acquireq a small strip of tract A, the 
uppermost tract, which strip bordered on the stream and was contiguous to 
her other land, tract C. Water was diverted from th~ stream at tract A for 
the use of a dwelling house situated on tract C. In a suit to enjoin 
such diversion, held, that tract C was not riparian to that portion of the 
stream opposite tract A and that such diversion was wrongful. Towii of 
Gorclo1isville v. Zi1111, (Va., 1921), ro6 S. E. 5o8. 
The cases are in conflict with regard to the extent of riparian land away 
from the stream~ According to one view represented by Anaheim U11io1i 
Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, land to be riparian to a stream must lie 
within the watershed thereof and extend in a continuous tract to the stream 
bank. rr L. R A. (N. S.) ro6z, 9 Ann. Cas. 1236. 
"The principal reason for the rule confining riparian rights to that 
part of the lands bordering on a stream which are within the water-
shed is that where water is used on such land it will, after such use, 
return to the stream, so far as it is not consumed, and that as the rain-
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fall on such land feeds the stream, the land is in consequence entitled, 
so to speak, to the use of the waters." Anaheim Union Water Co. v. 
F1'1ler, supra. 
In direct conflict to the preceding, it has been held that all lands belonging 
to one owner, irrespective of the time and manner of their acquisition, are 
riparian if any part borders on a watercourse. Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 
approved in Clark v. Allamaii, 7I Kan. 2o6. The principal case adopts the 
first view, with the qualification, however, that it is not sufficient that land, 
to be riparian, lie within the general watershed, but it is necessary that the 
land be within the specific watershed of that portion of the stream to which 
it is claimed to be riparian. The substantial question in the case is one of 
priorities. and the court might well have treated a decision of the question 
of what are "riparian" lands as immaterial and have held, as a matter of 
principle, that the defendant was not to be permitted to nullify the effect 
of the plaintiff's senior right through the acquisition of a small strip of land 
above the plaintiff. 
WILr.s-GIFT 'ro SUBSCRIBING WITNJ>Ss.-One of the two subscribing wit~ 
nesses to a will was also a beneficiary. A statute made all gifts to a sub-
scribing witness void unless there were two other competent witnesses to 
the will. Several bystanders, who had been present when testator executed 
the instrument, were introduced as witnesses to the will and were able to 
testify to the facts of testator's signature in conformity with the statute. 
Held, the term "witness to a will" has a well-settled meaning, and means 
one who has attested the will by subscribing his name thereto. In re John-
so1{ s Estate, (Wis., I92I), I83 N. W. 888. 
Some authorities hold that attestation to a will does not require sub-
scription by a witness. Swift v. Wiley, I B. Mon. II4; Tobin v. Haack, 79 
Minn. IOI. But the weight of authority is that attestation includes the act 
of subscription. Calkins v. Calkins, 2I6 Ill. 458. Under a statute requiring 
a will to be in writing and "witnessed" by two witnesses, it has been held 
that the witnesses should subscribe the will. In re Boyeies> Will, 23 Ia. 354-
In Pennsylvania, where the statute requires proof of the signature of the 
testator by at least two competent witnesses, subscription to the will is not 
necessary to make it valid. In re Irvine's Estat~ 2o6 Pa. I. The principal 
case is in accord with the weight of authority where this question has been 
presented. Yet no case requires that the subscribing witnesses be summoned 
to prove the will, or that it fail without them or upon their disputing its 
authenticity. The probate of a will duly executed does not depend on the 
lives of the witnesses, their recollection of the facts, or their truthfulness; 
any evidence is competent which tends to prove the legal execution of the 
instrument. Lyons v. Va.ii Riper, 26 N. J. Eq. 337; fa re Clafliti's Will, 73 
Vt. I29. The evidence of subscribing witnesses is entitled to no greater cre-
dence than that of others having an equal opportunity to know the facts 
on issues of sanity, undue influence, and the like. PAGE ON WILr.s, Sec. 366; 
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, Io6 Ala. 3I4; McTaggart v. Thompson, I4 
Pa. St. I49· The requirement of subscribing witnesses is for purposes of 
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more readily identifying the will as genuine. Appeal of Canada, 47 Conn. 
450; Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 439. In view of the fact that under com-
mon law rules of evidence a will might be established or overthrown by the 
testimony of witnesses other than the subscribing witnesses, it would not 
seem unreasonable to say that the term "competent'' witness, as used in this 
statute, need not have been construed to mean a subscribing witness. A dis-
senting opinion distinguishes between competent witnesses and competent 
subscribing witnesses, and maintains that the legislature had used the term 
"competent" witness purposely, not meaning thereby a subscribing witness. 
Since the present statute was an amendment of a previous one in which 
the term "competent subscribing'' witness was used, this contention seems 
the more forceful. The majority opinion characterized this omission as 
being legislative inadvertence. While sheer weight of precedent supports 
the decision, the rule of In re Irvine's Estate, supra, and the dissent in the 
principal case seem to have reason with them. 
WILLS-TESTATOR CoMP~LED To MAKE A WILL-PROOF OF ANIMUS 
Tus'l'ANDL-An instrument, sufficient in form to constitute a duly executed 
will, was offered for probate. The purported will was found in the archives 
of the Masonic Order. Testimony showed that thirteen years prior to his 
death deceased executed the instrument while there was being conferred on 
him a degree of the secret order mentioned, and that the making of the will 
was a part of the ceremony required of all candidates who had not thereto-
fore made a will. Held, deceased executed the instrument intending it to 
be his will. bi re Watkins' Estate, (Wash., 1921), 198 Pac. 721. 
An instrument to be a will must fulfill two requirements : it must be 
executed in accordance with the requirements of the statute; and the testator, 
at the time he executed it, must have had the animus testandi. There is no 
question in the principal case as to the former requirement, but the question 
is raised as to the latter-whether there is present the animus testandi when 
one is compelled to make a will, but is left free as to its provisions. In a 
North Carolina case decided in 1920 the deceased did not want to make a 
will, but the family physician informed him that he could not recover and 
compelled him to make one. Evidence showed that the deceased was unin-
fluenced as to its provisions. It was held that the instrument expressed the 
will of the testator and was therefore valid, even though executed under 
compulsion. There was a strong dissenting opinion, however, wherein it 
was argued that the undue influence used in getting the deceased to execute 
the instrument kept it from being his will. In re Lowe's Will, 104 S. E. 143. 
The decision in the principal case turns upon the question as to the amount 
of proof required to establish whether or not the instrument expresses the 
will of the testator. In establishing lack of animus testandi, the same rule 
governs as in establishing undue influence. The general rule is that the 
burden is upon the contestants. Egan v. Ega1rs Ex'r, 189 Ky. 332; Burke 
v. Burke, 184 N. Y. Supp. 673; Quaratiello v. Di Biasi, (R. I., 1921), n2 At!. 
215; Lister v. Smith, 3 Swabey & T. 282. In Roe v. Duty, (Wash., 1921), 
197 Pac. 47, it is held: "In the contest of a will for undue influence, :the 
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testimo~y to overcome the will must be cogent and convincing." A Missis• 
sippi case, in 1921, however, takes the opposite view as to the burden of 
proof, holding that when due execution and mental capacity are proved the 
proponents make out a prima facie case. When the contestants bring in 
evidence of undue influence, the burden of proof is upon the proponents to 
produce a preponderance of evidence. Isom v. Canedy, (Miss., 1921), 88 So. 
485. The testimony in the principal case is sufficient fo uphold the will even 
under the rule of the Mississippi case, for in the majority opinion it is said: 
"It remains to inquire whether the testator intended the instrument to be 
his will and testament. The evidence on the question is somewhat meagre, but 
we think the decided weight of evidence is that he so regarded it." But the 
dissenting opinion is not satisfied with even the rule of the Mississippi case 
requiring the proponents to produce a preponderance of evidence: "Mere 
preponderance of evidence should not be sufficient; the evidence should be 
such as to clearly, convincingly, and satisfactorily establish the intention." 
No authority is cited for this proposition and it is submitted that such a 
rule goes beyond the holding of decided cases. 
WITNESSES-CROSS-EXAMINATION-PREVIOUS ARREsT AND CONVICTION AS 
AFFECTING CREDIBILITY.-ln a pedestrian's action for injuries against an auto-
mobile owner the defendant was asked on cross-examination whether he had 
ever been arrested and convi~ed. Held, admissible on the issue of his 
credibility, the court saying that in determining the weight to be given his 
testimony the jury had a right to know what manner of man he had been. 
Van Goosen v. Barlimi. (Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 8. 
The rule of the common law was that persons convicted of treason, 
felony, and the cri111e1i. falsi were rendered infamous, and were disqualified 
as witnesses. In determining whether the crime was infamous the test 
seems to be "whether the crime shows such depravity in the perpetration, 
or such a disposition to pervert public justice in the courts, as creates a 
violent presumption against his truthfulness under oath." Smith v. State, 
129 Ala. 89. This disqualification has now, of course been removed by 
statute, but conviction of some crimes is everywhere conceded to be admis-
sible for the purpose of impeachment. However, due to statutes and dif-
ference in judicial opinion, the authorities are not in harmony as to what 
convictions may be shown for this purpose. Some cases hold that the con-
viction must be for a crime of an infamous character. Matzenbaugh v. 
People, 194 III. 108; State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 363; Williams v. State, 144 
Ala. 14. Sometimes a distinction seems to be drawn as t6 whether a mis-
demeanor involves moral turpitude or not. Wheeler v. Stat.e, 4 Ga. App. 325; 
Hightower v. State (Tex.), 165 S. W. 184 The tendency, however. is to 
simplify the rule defining the kinds of crime and make it all crimes or 
felonies, thus doing away with the subtleties of the common law. W1GMORE 
ON EVIDENCE, Vol. 2, Sec. g87. The Michigan court seems to define crime 
as meaning all criminal offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors. It 
seems difficult to see how conviction for some misdemeanors would throw 
light on a witness's credibility, but such a rule is upheld, perhaps, on the 
theory that if he has been guilty of violation of law he might be more apt 
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to violate his oath. At all events, the matter rests largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and a wide latitude is allowed in Michigan to 
afford a full inquiry into the history of the witness in order to illustrate 
his true character. Wilbitr v. Flood, 16 Mich. 41; A<niold v. Nye, 23 Mich. 
286. The doctrine of these early cases has been quite consistently adhered 
to in this state in the matter of interrogating a witness as to his conviction 
of crimes. 
WoRKMSN's Co:MPSNSA't10N-AccmEN'TAL INJURY.-A robust city fire-
man was called out to fight a fire on a bitterly cold day. He worked steadily 
for six and one-half hours. During that period he fought two stubborn 
fires with insufficient men. Expert evidence proved that the layer of ice 
one inch thick which formed at the back of his neck caused a contraction 
of the muscles, displacing the axis and at las vertebrae, producing pressure 
on the spinal cord, resulting in paralysis and death. Held (two judges dis-
senting), death was not due: to accidental injury. Savage v. City of Po11tiac, 
Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 7g8. 
Conceding that courts have not yet found an entirely satisfactory defini-
tion of accident, in both England and the United States they have quite gen· 
erally agreed that the word must be interpreted according to its ordinary 
and popular meaning, and they have defined it as m~ m1looked-for or ii11to-
ward eve11t which was t1ot expected or desig1wd~ Fenton v. Thorley, [1903], 
A. C. 443; Brfatons v. Turvey, [1905], A. C. 230; Bryant v. Piss.ell, (1913), 
84 N. J. L. 72; Boody v. K. & C. Mfg. Co., (1914), 77 N. H. 208. The Eng-
lish and American cases generally hold that where the exposure is more 
than ordinary for that sort of employment, or where the other conditions vary 
from the normal in that employment so as to make it more hazardous, an 
injury resulting therefrom is an accidental injury. Where a miner died as 
a result of a chill contracted by reason of being required to stand in cold 
wate11 up to his knees for twenty-five minutes, death was due to an accident. 
Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, (1913), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 213. Where, by reason 
of his boat; overturning, a pilot got wet up to the thighs and contracted sci-
atica, it was held that he was injured by accident. Barbeary v. Chugg, (1915), 
84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 504 Prostration by sunstroke may be found to be an 
accident. Morgati v. The Zenaida, (1919), 25 Times L. R. 446. Death result-
ing from a heat-stroke has been held to be an accident, even though the 
work of a trimmer on a steamship would naturally expose the workman to 
intense heat. Ismay v. Williamson, [1go8], A. C. 437. A workman employed 
to cut grass along -a railroad right-of-way suffered an accidental injury when 
he died from poison ivy infection. Plass v. Central New E11gla11d R. Co., (1915), 
155 N. Y. Supp. 854 Where the employe is injured by a frostbite. the more 
recent cases would allow recovery for an injury by accident. Days v. S. 
Trimmer & Sons, (1916), 162 N. Y. Supp. 603; Nikkicziek v. McArthur, 
(Alberta, 1916), 28 D. L. R. 279. 
It must be clear that in some of the cases considered above there was 
nothing extraordinary about the conditions of employment, and in others 
the deviation from the normal exposure for that particular employment was 
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very little. In a Michigan case, La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 
6o4, the facts were that a workman died from slow paralysis due to cerebral 
hemorrhage. The high temperature of the room in which he worked induced 
an increase in blood pressure which resulted in the rupture of a small blood 
vessel in the brain. The court there held that death was due to an accidental 
injury, and allowed recovery. The court said, "Mr. La Veck intended to do 
the prolonged work which the situation demanded, but he did not anticipate 
that because of doing so his blood pressure would be so increased as to 
result in the rupture of a cerebral blood vessel." Could not the court have 
said in the principal case that Mr. Savage intended to do the prolonged work 
which the situation demanded, but he did not antiCipate that because of 
doing so the muscular contraction due to the formation of ice on his neck 
would dislocate the axis and atlas vertebrae, producing paralysis? A clear 
analysis of these two cases will reveal that the situations and causative fac-
tors are substantially alike in both. Upon both reason and authority, the 
principal case seems wrongly decided. In the matter of finding a reasonable 
guide for determining when an accident has been sustained, the Michigan 
Supreme Court has been peculiarly unsuccessful. See La Veck v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., supra; Roach v. Kelsey Wheel Co., 200 Mich. 299; Tackles v. 
Bryant & Detwiler Co., 200 Mich. 350; Guthrie v. Detroit Shipbuildinq Co.,. 
200 Mich. 355. 
